Marbury vs Madison

Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court.
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided:
1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
3dly. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
The first object of enquiry is: Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
His right originates in an act of congress passed in February, 1801, concerning the district of Columbia. This law enacts, "that there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties, such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the president of the United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five years."
It appears, from the affidavits, that in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a justice of peace for the county of Washington, was signed by John Adams, then president of the United States; after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it; but the commission has never reached the person for whom it was made out.
In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to enquire whether he has been appointed to the office. For if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office, which, being completed, became his property.
The 2d section of the 2d article of the constitution, declares, that "the president shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for." The third section declares, that "he shall commission all the officers of the United States." An act of congress directs the secretary of state to keep the seal of the United States, "to make out and record, and affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States, to be appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the senate, or by the President alone; provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same shall have been signed by the President of the United States."
These are the clauses of the constitution and laws of the United States, which affect this part of the case. They seem to contemplate three distinct operations:
1st, The nomination. This is the sole act of the President, and is completely voluntary.
2d. The appointment. This is also the act of the President, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be performed by and with the advice and consent of the senate.
3d. The commission. To grant a commission to a person appointed, might perhaps be deemed a duty enjoined by the constitution. "He shall," says that instrument, "commission all the officers of the United States."
This is an appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and is evidenced by no act but the commission itself.... The last act to be done by the President, is the signature of the commission. He has then acted on the advice and consent of the senate to his own nomination. The time for deliberations has then passed. He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and consent of the senate concurring with his nomination, has been made, and the officer is appointed. This appointment is evidenced by an open, unequivocal act; and being the last act required from the person making it, necessarily excludes the idea of its being, so far as respects the appointment, an inchoate and incomplete transaction.
The signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission; and the great seal is only to be affixed to an instrument which is complete. It asserts, by an act supposed to be of public notoriety, the verity of the Presidential signature.
It is never to be affixed till the commission is signed, because the signature, which gives force and effect to the commission, is conclusive evidence that the appointment is made.
The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the secretary of state is prescribed by law, and not to be guided by the will of the President. He is to affix the seal of the United States to the commission, and is to record it.
This is not a proceeding which may be varied, if the judgment of the executive shall suggest one more eligible; but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of the secretary of state to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey the laws. He acts, in this regard, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose....
The discretion of the executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases, where, by law, the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional, power of accepting or rejecting it.
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President, and sealed by the secretary of state, was appointed; and as the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the laws of his country.
To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.
This brings us to the second enquiry; which is, 2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the department of foreign affairs. This office, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
If this be the rule, let us enquire how it applies to the case under the consideration of the court.
The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political powers, to be exercised by the President according to his own discretion. When he has made an appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been completely applied to the case.
The question whether a right has vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority. If, for example, Mr. Marbury had taken the oaths of a magistrate, and proceeded to act as one; in consequence of which a suit had been instituted against him, in which his defence had depended on his being a magistrate; the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority.
So, if he conceives that, by virtue of his appointment, he has a legal right, either to the commission which has been made out for him, or to a copy of that commission, it is equally a question examinable in a court, and the decision of the court upon it must depend on the opinion entertained of his appointment.
That question has been discussed, and the opinion is, that the latest point of time which can be taken as that at which the appointment was complete, and evidenced, was when, after the signature of the president, the seal of the United States was affixed to the commission.
It is then the opinion of the court: 1st. That by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the president of the United States appointed him a justice  of peace, for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia; and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the secretary of state, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and that the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five years. 2dly. That, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which, is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
It remains to be enquired whether, 3dly. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on, 1st. The nature of the writ applied for, and, 2dly. The power of this court.
1st. The nature of the writ.
If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under the color of his office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment of the law. How then can his office exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct, if the case be such a case as would, were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process?
It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done that the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus, is to be determined. Where the head of a department acts in a case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of executive will; it is again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation.
But where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of which he is not placed under the particular direction of the President, and the performance of which, the President cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is never presumed to have forbidden; as for example, to record a commission which has received all the legal solemnities, it is not perceived on what ground the courts of the country are further excused from the duty of giving judgment, that right be done to an injured individual, than if the same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a department....
It was at first doubted whether the action of detinue was not a specified legal remedy for the commission which has been withheld from Mr. Marbury; in which case a mandamus would be improper. But this doubt has yielded to the consideration that the judgment in detinue is for the thing itself, or its value. The value of a public office not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained; and the applicant has a right to the office itself, or to nothing. He will obtain the office by obtaining the commission, or a copy of it from the record.
This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be enquired, Whether it can issue from this court.
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the supreme court "to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States."
The secretary of state, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction."
It has been insisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, to the supreme and inferior courts, is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the supreme court, contains no negative or restrictive words; the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial powers, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made  in the constitution, is form without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of  these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions -- a written constitution -- would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favor of its rejection.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?  This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read, or to obey? There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this subject. It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law. The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."
If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve?
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on the subject. It is in these words, "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution, and laws of the United States."
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
Note: Top image: Chief Justice John Marshall; bottom image: William Marbury

The Prime Directive vs One world government

The Prime Directive forbids Starfleet or the Federation to interfere with the cultural development of another world.  On Earth this should be extended to forbiding the cultural or political development of another nation, unless that nation asks for help.  It would be foolhardy for a "one world government" to be put in place.

There is a lesson that can be learned by the Galactic Empire of the Star Wars Saga.  The Galactic Emperor, Palpatine had absolute power.  The UN is a federation rather than a one world government.  The nations on this planet should cooperate rather than band together in a one world government.

Wicca vs Roman Militarism

Wicca is different from Roman militarism.  Wiccans are healers.  Some Pagans that are Asatru (worshippers of the Norse Gods) are warriors.  The Romans were into conquest and ultimately paid the price.  The Germans sacked Rome and basically trashed it.  Wicca is a reconstruction of the Druids, who beleived in a Triple Goddess (Maiden, Mother and Crone) and a young God and Old God.

alcohol vs marijuana

You know, good alcohol is a great substiute for marijuana.  It gets you just as wasted.  The best thing about alcohol is that it is legal, unlike marijuana.

Ceremonial Magic vs Wicca

There is a large difference between Wicca and Ceremonial magick.  Wicca honors a Goddess and a God, has the Wiccan law, "If it harm none, love, do as you will."  Real Wiccans DO NOT conjure demons. (Many CM's [Ceremonial Magicians] do)  Wiccans believe that whatever you send out returns to you threefold regardless.  CM's believe that a spell only comes back on you if the defense is greater than the power of the spell.  CM's in my opinion harbor much pride.

"Ceremonial magic is frequently referred to as "high magic," although the terms are not actually synonymous. High magic is magic which has the ultimate purpose of bringing the magician closer with the divine. Historically, this is what ceremonial magicians claimed to be doing, in comparison with "low magic," which had mere practical purposes, was often considered to be rooted in superstition, and was sometimes equated with witchcraft.
Some modern witches do work purely practical magic. Many, however, work their magic in a very religious context and view their magic as drawing upon some connection with the divine."

CM's often feel they are better than Wiccans.

Mainframes vs ATX computers

Large mainframes are bad for the planet.  They are also hard to maintain and require clean places to operate.  A small ATX form factor tower computer with a good RAID array is good for servers.  It is also less expensive than those antiquated computers.

dynasties vs democracies

We do not need any royal rulers or dynasties.  We also need not any facism like Nazi Germany or Mousolini's Italy.  All we need is a government the way the founding fathers of the USA intended.  It is almost the 4th of July.  Time to light a few M-80's, bottle rockets and Black Cat firecrackers.

Democracy Vs. Kings

Democracy guarantees rights to the states and the people.  It is in the Bill of Rights.  Kings can be despots, and a dictator is just like a kingship without a royal line.  Egypt had kings, Israel had them, Babylon had them, Rome had emperors,  Charlemange was the one in control of the "holy Roman Empire", England had kings and queens.  Hitler, Mousalini and Stalin were despots, and Stalin was revered in Russia (USSR) until Glastnos and Peristroikia.  America was unique in 1776.  It was the first republic, first under the articles of confederation, and in 1881, under the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, guaranteeing, of many things, free speech, free press and freedom of religion.  There is also a separation of powers in the USA - Legislative, Executive (The President), and Judicial, and no president is above the law in this country.  The Constitution was designed to both protect this nation from the tyrany of the minority and the tyrany of the majority.

Koran Burning vs. Real Patriotism

Koran Burning versus Real Patriotism

author: Devil's Advocate

Any fanatic can burn a book, or a flag, because it doesn't require rational explanation. But anyone with the brain of a troglodyte could appreciate there is complexity to the reality of most religions and belief systems. Once again high-minded religion plays its hand in the human affairs of politics, as Jones also sees the trumped up Muslim Mosque controversy, to be built close to ground zero, as seriously provocation. But real patriotism includes having a willing to seek out the truth.

Koran Burning versus Real Patriotism By the devil's advocate The burning of a book, be it secular or religious, offers little in the way of cogent criticism. Any fanatic can burn a book, or a flag, because it doesn't require rational explanation. And yet burning still has the dramatic effect of engaging violence through destruction. It is clearly an "inflammatory" act of rejection—showing no subtly and little thought. But anyone with the brain of a troglodyte could appreciate there is complexity to the reality of most religions and belief systems. For example, religions, as institutions, have generally helped societies establish norms of morality in "temporal" time for almost all societies; even if some have had a morbid focus of what happens after death. Still the major effect has been the same—securing peace and prosperity with standards of morality in the here and now—even if at times they could equal create a partial form of psychological slavery. And granted, there are moments in history when acts of defiance and rebellion are in order—such as when a government pretends to act in accordance with its own laws but does not. Surely then sedition of burning a symbol for such perceived hypocrisy or criminality, and as argued an act of free speech, sends some sort of message—even if it offers little in the way of diplomacy or any awareness to nuance. But what is striking about Rev. Terry Jones decision to burn the Koran, as he calls evil, is his complete lack of awareness of the Christian Bible and Jewish Torah, which can also be shown to be demonstrably evil in some of their passages. (See Charles Kimball's When Religion Becomes Evil, John Shelby Spong's The Sins of Scripture, or EvilBible.com and SkepticsAnnotatedBible.com.) One could argue that Reverend Terrance Jones is just a narrow-minded and parochial man; or he is just one of many of the hoi polloi of populism easily stirred to passionate acts by self-righteousness and twisted demagoguery. But he clearly invokes, as his justification, the "absolute" truth or Biblical Truth as to why the Koran is evil. And this is the mindset of the fanatic—he sees things in terms of everything being either black and white or good and evil. And once again high-minded religion plays its hand in the human affairs of politics, as Jones also sees the trumped up Muslim Mosque controversy, to be built close to ground zero, as seriously provocation. This political debate was spurred on by the Anti-Defamation League, that also engaged in an inflammatory act by equally suggesting Islamism, the religion and followers, is evil; just like ADL has previously sponsored the showing of a film that also had similar prejudicial effects toward Muslims and the Islamic religion. Now the mosque issue has become a political potato with demagogues wanting to pounce all over it. But more importantly the controversy had the effect of reinforcing the conspiratorial "lie" that 9/11 was carried out by "radical Muslims;" when there is very strong indications that Osama bin Laden did not have a thing to do with 9/11—rather we Americans were subject to "phony" videos of him claiming responsibility, obviously created by "covert" third-party sources. Nevertheless the sound bite would play over and over again over the years until most Americans accepted it as gospel truth. Apparently the hidden "goal" of creating animosity and war between Western countries, that is those comprised of mostly Christians, and Islamic countries, was significantly advanced because of 9/11. Some people wanted a "clash" of civilizations, especially since the War on Terrorism closely overlaps those countries with oil, gas or need of pipelines. But real patriotism includes having a willing to seek out the truth about what really happened on 9/11 and why. Unfortunately there are few real patriots in the U.S. where people are more comfortable believing official lies and being misled by wedge issues. Not even most progressives would dare look too deeply into this event for fear of what they might learn. Yet one could ask a significant question about 9/11— "Who Benefited?" That is what mystery readers learn to ask. We know, for example, Larry Silverman, as the recent buyer of the Twin Towers, benefited. We know drug cartels re-opened the opium trade that Osama bin Laden and the Taliban had closed down to a trickle. We are sure investors in the military industrial complex again could make money on America's addiction to war. We know oil and energy companies were to benefit and financially they did. Also we know Israel benefited because they seriously wanted Iraq defanged and "strongly" lobbied the U.S. to go to war against their enemy. Right-wing elements that wanted more Executive Presidential command won out as some were even hankering for the de-establishment of American civil rights. Also 9/11 advanced an attempt to create more paranoia of all things Islamic and to create a multi-generation war as a new era of Christian crusades against the Islamic empire. And naturally George Bush's popularity initially went up when he became a war president—but being the mediocre man that he was he lost much of his standing over the longer run. Powerful spheres of influence actually benefited from 9/11. But how did Osama bin Laden, or countries and people in the Middle East such as Iraq and Afghanistan, or even Al Qaeda, to the extent that it is a real threat, benefit? There does not seem to be much logical motivation for such a provocative act of war against the security apparatus of the U.S.—and all the planning involved? Nevertheless, arguments about burning the Koran and whether a Mosque should be allowed in New York City work well as red herrings, because they continue to reinforce the idea that argued 19 Arabs, under the direction of one Osama bin Laden hidden in a cave on the other side of the planet, actually carried out this act of war against American civilians. Similarly the crafted incident of the pantyhose bomber around Christmas worked very well as a red herring to cover up and stop any debate on whether Muslims held in Guantanamo, for years now, had a right to a public trial. Instead the two corrupt parties of the United States have continued to allow the military to quietly ship those captives, some who were tortured, out of our country so we Americans will not see the details of how and why they got there—including children and elderly—as our judicial system continues to also degrade and be subjugated to more political authoritarianism. Nevertheless, despite some revealing videos that came out from the 9/11 Truth Movement, such as Loose Change, even within the context of a propaganda war meant to discredit it and conspiracy theorists, and also hireling idiots pretending to be truthers only to act stupidly and confuse issues to also discredit the movement, the reality seems that most Americans really don't care or want to know the truth about what really happened on 9/11; anymore than Rev. Terry Jones wants to know the truth about the Bible—that is it is "not" gospel truth—rather it is the product of human minds pretending to speak for a God—and meanwhile imposing their own ideas of a God on those naïve enough to believe and follow. And no doubt, Jesus himself, was a fanatic of sorts, at least we can gain such perspective from accounts written about him in the four gospels that spent plenty of effort creating frothy polemics between the "bureaucratic" Pharisees and that minority who claimed true righteousness. From there perspectives of bickering amongst various Jewish factions we can see attitudes of sanctimony on all sides—still the to-be Christians defined the church of believers as those people who practiced ethical standards—rather than relying on the more narrow presumption of Jewish heredity—and this is certainly radical because it still speaks to the Middle East today and their concerns of ethnic identity. But one outcome of authoritarian religions, like the three Abrahamic religions, is they help condition people to a tendency to blind obedience to authority, and equally to a blind form of patriotism that does not question government. It is similar to what Eric Fromm spoke of in his Escape From Freedom, a kind of apathy of evil, and what Eric Hoffer referred to as a "religiofication" of a political cause in his The True Believer. Factions of the Tea Party had an opportunity to see how corrupt the system has become. Instead, opportunists like Glenn Beck, and his "Restoring Honor" rally, are hoodwinking many of them, and steering them back to the two party system. (Shortly after the rally there was leaked a video clip of Beck having a photo shoot in which he was putting Vicks rub in his eyes to make him look like he was crying—real honest honor—don't yah know—like Sara Palin trying to sound like the people from Lake Wobegon, in Keiller's Prairie Home Companion Show—as if we are all so homey.) Yes, there they were calling for a religious revival like a bandwagon back to nowhere. And there is nothing to wanting to restore America's honor—since the Bush Administration especially did so much to spoil it. But then Glen Beck goes on to question President's take on Christianity, as branded as understanding the world through "liberation theology," that is seeing the world as victims and oppressors, as Beck worded it. But how funny a Fox news anchor would make such an accusation when Rupert Murdock's Fox News helped lie our people into going to war with an aftermath of killing hundreds of thousands of innocent people in process? And how funny this newly minted Mormon would question Obama's interpretations of faith, when few Mormons said anything, while proselytizing in the south, about U.S. supported atrocities in Central America, whereas some Catholic priests were murdered when they risked their lives to speak out for the oppressed and poor? This cynical ploy on the part of Beck is another attempt to paint Obama as a Marxist, since liberation theology started in Latin America where some Catholic priests believed industrial countries were exploiting the people. Since then the propaganda has been one of labeling them all communists. Get it—there are no oppressed—there are no victims—and if you feel empathy there is something wrong with your religious instincts. Moreover this is an attempt to subordinate the power of religions to the power of modernity's economic religions—in which religions are not to criticize the "sanctity" of economic ideals—now we must maintain an unquestioning loyalty of economic propaganda—and see everything in terms of black and white or good and evil. Investor money can do not wrong; and therefore there should be no checks on how the wealth class invests money or make profit. Laissez capitalism is "beyond" human scrutiny like God has an authoritarian right to make commands, and control governments and their governed. (But the idea that religion should work for state power, or the power of the rich, is nothing new and it certainly does not foster the individual right to self-determination or personal opinion.) Glenn Beck is far more an issue than 15 minutes of fame for a redneck of a Pentecostal preacher from Florida. Beck calls liberation theology "collectivist" psychology. But every rightwing form of governance has demanded various forms of collectivist conformity—including some religions that have used the terrorism of threat of hell as the ultimate form of coercion—like one should not be concerned about political issues when one is so seriously concerned about what happens to the self after death. One wonders what kind of psyche Mr. Beck espouses—if not some kind of subordination to his own half-baked presumptions—even as he so readily espouses "individual" salvation. Somehow he wants Joe McCarthy's style of beheading individualism—while speaking in tongues? Besides Mormonism doesn't especially espouse a lot of individuality or does it? The Tea Party is partially right about big government and big spending. But what do they say about the huge increase in Homeland Security spending and its bureaucracy? Several weeks ago the Washington Post started reporting on a study called "Top Secret America" in which it revealed 1,200 government organizations and 1,900 private companies were working on counter-terrorism, intelligence and security, spending billions and billions of tax dollars. What does the Tea Party have to say about this? Both political parties are corrupt. Ralph Nader tried telling Americans but they accused him of an "ego" issue—total B.S. bought the fools swallowed it. Dennis Kucinich and Ron Paul were the two main party candidates who were interested in representing real Americans; but the mainstream media and the two corrupt parties, and the shadow government, were not going to let either become president. Obviously there needs to be change—but it is not going to come by having the blind lead the blind. Still the books have "already" been written. Good politicians need quote the books that have shed light on what has already been revealed to win elections. John Dean wrote a book on the authoritarian personalities in the Bush Administration—certainly Barbara Boxer could shed light on Carly Fiorina's obvious authoritarian personality with her accusations that Boxer had the temerity to question authority rather than just salute. Certainly good politicians can learn to teach Americans how to think. Why did all these people bother to write all these revealing books about our government and few, any of these candidates, are either education themselves or others? Why for example did David Brock bother to write his Blinded by the Right? Our founding fathers had a debate between the federalists and the anti-federalists. These people were educated to human foible and political vulnerability. These debates had little to do with some authoritarian God commanding anyone on anything. If patriots owe this country anything they owe themselves the responsibility of becoming more savvy than the currently are at with more chicken hawk poster boys crying on the mall.